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A CONDITIONAL INTENT TO
PERFORM
Gregory Klass*
Georgetown University Law Center
The doctrine of promissory fraud holds that a contractual promise implicitly represents an intent to perform. A promisor’s conditional intent to perform poses a problem
for that doctrine. It is clear that some undisclosed conditions on the promisor’s intent
should result in liability for promissory fraud. Yet no promisor intends to perform
come what may, so there is a sense in which all promisors conditionally intend to
perform.
Building on Michael Bratman’s planning theory of intentions, this article provides a
theoretical account of the distinction between “foreground” and “background” conditions on intentions in general and then explains why foreground conditions on a
promisor’s intent to perform are likely to result in material promissory misrepresentation, while background conditions are not. The difference between foreground and
background conditions lies in whether the agent accepts the satisfaction of the condition for the purposes of her practical reasoning. A promisor’s nonacceptance of a
condition on her intent to perform is material because it is likely to affect her preperformance deliberations and investment in the transaction, as well as her willingness
to seek agreement with the promisee on how to ﬁll contractual gaps.

There seems an obvious difference between conditional and unconditional
intentions. Consider the two reports “I intend to go to the faculty meeting”
and “I intend to go to the faculty meeting if I ﬁnish preparing my class.” The
ﬁrst says that I simply mean to be there; the second that I mean be there
in some possible futures and not in others. But perhaps the difference
is only apparent. While my report that I intend simpliciter to go to the
meeting does not describe my intention as conditional, it would be silly
to understand me as saying that I mean to go no matter what. I do not
intend to go if the meeting is cancelled. Nor do I expect to go if something
more important comes up. I intend to go to the meeting ceteris paribus:
unless something occurs to prevent me or to cause me to reconsider. A bit
of reﬂection suggests that one never intends to do something come what
*This article has beneﬁted from the input of Michael Bratman, Luca Ferrero, David Owens,
and Gideon Yaffe as well as anonymous referees from LEGAL THEORY. My thanks to all, and
to Addison Draper and Gregory Zlotnick for their research assistance and Ian Ayres for our
earlier collaboration.
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may—that all intentions are subject to innumerable implicit ceteris paribus
conditions. And now it looks as though the difference between the two
cases lies not in the intention itself but in the way I describe it. While a
report “I intend x if C” provides more information about when the speaker
is likely to x, the attitude it reports is not different in kind from a nominally
unconditional intention.
The slipperiness in the distinction between conditional and unconditional intentions creates a puzzle in a corner of contract theory. According
to the doctrine of promissory fraud, a contractual promise implicitly represents a present intent to perform. To make a promise one intends to breach
is to tell a lie. A plaintiff who can prove promissory fraud can recover not
only compensatory damages for the breach but also punitive damages; in
some cases an insincere promisor can even face criminal penalties. The puzzle is whether an undisclosed condition on the promisor’s intent to perform
should result in liability for promissory fraud.
Consider the facts in Hillcrest Center, Inc. v. Rone, in which the owner
of a commercial building told a tenant that she intended to purchase an
adjacent lot to provide parking for the tenant.1 The Alabama Supreme
Court upheld a jury ﬁnding of fraud based on evidence that the defendant
“never intended to purchase the adjacent lot to provide the additional
parking unless she was able to secure a tenant for the proposed building to be
built on the adjacent lot (a ‘contingency’ [the owner] never communicated
to the [tenant]).”2 The holding feels right: the defendant represented that
she intended to purchase the lot, not that she intended to purchase it only
if certain conditions were satisﬁed. But if this is correct, we need to be able
to say why this condition on the defendant’s intent resulted in a material
misrepresentation while the ceteris paribus conditions that attach to all
intentions do not.
In our book, Insincere Promises: The Law of Misrepresented Intent, Ian Ayres
and I suggest that the difference involves informational disparities.3 If every
representation of an unconditional intention includes an implicit ceteris
paribus clause, then the competent hearer is on notice that the speaker’s
intention is so conditioned. And because parties enter into agreements with
a shared background understanding as to what might cause the promisor
to choose not to perform or prevent her from doing so, they have a shared
understanding of the extension of that implicit ceteris paribus—of what
counts as “other things being equal.” Neither of the Hillcrest parties would
have expected the defendant to purchase the adjacent lot if it were destroyed by ﬂood or even if its price suddenly skyrocketed (though in the
latter case, the defendant might still be liable for breach of a promise to
1. Hillcrest Center, Inc. v. Rone, 711 So. 2d 901, 903 (Ala. 1997).
2. Id. at 906.
3. IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW OF MISREPRESENTED INTENT
26–29 (2005).
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purchase). This explains the court’s emphasis on the fact that the defendant “never communicated” that her intent to purchase was conditioned
on ﬁnding a tenant for the property. Because that condition fell outside the
mutually understood scope of the implicit ceteris paribus, it rendered false
the defendant’s representation that she intended to perform.
This information-based account was of a piece with our project in Insincere
Promises: to develop a theory of promisor representations of intent, not of
promisor intentions per se. For this reason, however, the explanation is
incomplete. There is a strong intuition that there is an intrinsic difference
between the implicit ceteris paribus conditions that attach to all intentions
and more salient conditions on a person’s intent such as the undisclosed
condition in Hillcrest—a difference not only in what is known about the
conditions but between ways that intentions are conditional. This article
argues that this intuition is correct. The goal is to provide a theory of
the intuitive distinction between what I henceforth call “background” and
“foreground” conditions and to explain the relation of each to the law of
promissory fraud.
My account of the distinction builds on Michael Bratman’s planning
theory of intention.4 In our book, Ayres and I write that a “promisor’s
intention to perform is material only because it entails her being likely
to perform, only because it provides the promisee crucial information for
evaluating [the probability of performance].”5 This claim focuses on the
fact that intentions tend to cause persons who have them to do the acts
intended.6 A person’s intention to x makes it more likely that she will x.
Standing alone, this is a fairly anemic picture of future-directed intentions.
In it, a future-directed intention operates something like a billiard ball: once
put in motion, the intention rolls along in a straight line without disturbing
the rest of the table until it reaches its target, unless it is knocked off
course by unanticipated circumstances or the player changes her mind and
grabs it mid-course. Bratman’s planning theory argues that things are more
complex. A person’s future-directed intentions not only cause her to do the
intended act but shape her practical deliberations and behavior leading up
to that point in a way that ensures the coherence and effectiveness of her
practical attitudes as a whole. This is what it means to have an intention. On
Bratman’s theory, the billiard ball on the way to its target interacts with the
table as a whole in a way that both increases the chances it will reach the
target and organizes the other balls in light of the shot.
This theory allows for a more complete description of the difference
between background and foreground conditions on an agent’s intention.
The difference lies in the consequences of each for the agent’s practical
deliberations. A person’s intention is background-conditional when she
4. This is laid out in MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON (1987).
5. AYRES & KLASS, supra note 3, at 35.
6. I use “cause” here in the broadest sense possible. I mean to suggest nothing about the
sort of causal mechanisms at work.
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assumes for the purpose of her practical deliberations that the condition will
or that it will not be satisﬁed. Her intention is foreground-conditional when
she treats the satisfaction of the condition as an open question. Foreground
conditions on an agent’s intention have two important consequences for
her ongoing deliberation and behavior: they permit her to plan rationally
for more possible futures, including futures in which she does not perform
the act in question, and they reduce the rational pressure on her to intend
the necessary means of acting.
This theory suggests three reasons why a promisee should care more about
a foreground condition than a background condition on the promisor’s
intent to perform. First, foreground conditions are likely to affect the
promisor’s preperformance practical deliberations and investments in the
transaction in a way that further decreases the likelihood of performance.
Second, the promisor herself has made a (perhaps reﬂexive) judgment
that the chance the condition will not be satisﬁed is high enough to warrant taking it into account in her own deliberations—prima facie evidence
that the promisee would also do well to consider that possibility. Finally,
in relational contracts a foreground condition on the promisor’s intent to
perform reduces the rational pressure to ﬁll contract gaps in a way that
agrees with the plans and preferences of the promisee. These conclusions
suggest a new account of what, if anything, a promise implicitly represents
about any conditions on the promisor’s intent to perform. They also answer
Aditi Bagchi’s and Richard Craswell’s suggestions that, from the consequentialist perspective Ayres and I adopt, the legal question should be not the
promisor’s intent to perform but only the probability of performance.7
After I describe the shortcomings of two other theories of background
and foreground intentions in Section I of this article, Section II lays out
the analytic groundwork for a planning theory of conditional intentions,
which I then develop in Section III. This general theory provides the basis
for Section IV’s reexamination of the legal relevance of a conditional intent
to perform. Readers interested only in the theory of intentions might skip
Section IV; readers whose primary interest is in contract law might skip
Section I, read only the summary of Section III, and focus their attention
on Section IV.
The analysis in this article has beneﬁted from two recent works of conditional intentions. Gideon Yaffe applies Bratman’s planning theory of intentions to provide a new analysis of how conditional intentions should ﬁgure
into criminal mens rea inquiries.8 While my account relies on some of his
insights, Yaffe does not tackle the problem of this article: the difference

7. Aditi Bagchi, The Accidental Promise: Remaking the Law of Misrepresented Intent, 2008 U.
ILL. L. REV. 985 (reviewing AYRES & KLASS, supra note 3); Richard Craswell, Taking Information
Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565
(2006).
8. Gideon Yaffe, Conditional Intent and Mens Rea, 10 LEGAL THEORY 273 (2004).
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between background and foreground conditions.9 Luca Ferrero applies
Bratman’s planning theory to provide a more general account of conditional intentions.10 Ferrero’s analysis of the difference between background and foreground conditions parallels one of my central claims:
that background conditions are conditions that the agent accepts in her
practical deliberations. Our analyses of the structure of conditional intentions, however, are different. For example, where Ferrero argues against a
truth-functional reading of intended conditions, I argue for that reading,
at least with respect to consequences for the agent’s practical deliberations.
This allows me to identify and examine a broader range of conditional
intentions.
The doctrinal consequences of this analysis are not earth-shattering. If
promissory fraud is but one room in the house of contract law, claims
based on a conditional intent to perform are something like a knickknack
on the mantle. Nor does this article recommend doctrinal reform; the
project is purely analytic. But just as the existence and function of the
law of promissory fraud illuminate the structure and purpose of contract
law as a whole, so, too, the correct analysis of conditional intentions to
perform casts new light on contractual relationships more generally. In
many instances, contracting parties agree not only to perform, or to perform
or pay damages; they agree to enter into a shared project that assumes
ﬂexibility and mutual responsiveness. Partly because of this, contractual
obligations often do not map onto everything to which the parties have
agreed. There are reasons to think that this is a good thing, despite the
claims of many ﬁrst-generation relational-contract theorists.11 It does not
follow, however, that the law as a whole—and especially the law of fraud—is
or should be indifferent to the complexity of the extralegal relationships
between contracting parties. Nor should contract theory ignore it. The
proper legal attitude toward the extralegal, relationship-based expectations
and obligations that come with agreements for consideration is a central
question for contract theory. The doctrine of promissory fraud, the puzzle
of conditional intentions to perform, and Bratman’s planning theory of
intention together provide the beginnings of a more nuanced account of
those expectations and obligations and of the law’s proper response to
them.
9. Yaffe does not need to, for he argues that the line for criminal liability cuts across that
distinction. Id. at 290–298.
10. Luca Ferrero, Conditional Intentions, NOÛS (forthcoming) (references are to paragraph
numbers in version 2.5, Nov. 30, 2008, on ﬁle with the author). I am especially grateful for
Ferrero’s permission to cite and discuss a paper that he is still in the process of revising. It
might turn out that some of my comments or criticisms do not apply to the published version of
Ferrero’s article. If so, they should be read as snippets from the middle of a conversation—one
from which I have greatly beneﬁted.
11. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847
(2000). For an overview, see Dori Kimel, The Choice of Paradigm for Theory of Contract: Reﬂections
on the Relational Model, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 238, 250–253 (2007).
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I. THE AWARENESS THEORY AND THE REASON THEORY

The intuitive distinction between background and foreground conditions
on a person’s intention is reﬂected in how we describe the effect of changed
circumstances. Suppose Jones owns a successful coffee shop and learns that
the store next door is going to be vacated. Jones has been thinking about
expanding, so she enters into a contract with the owner of the neighboring
building to purchase it in six months. Jones does not, however, have the
funds to renovate the space, and she has had some credit problems. Knowing
all this, Jones forms a conditional intent that she will purchase the building
only if she secures a construction loan. If Jones does not get the loan and
then chooses not to purchase, we would not say that she has changed her
mind. The situation would be different if Jones decided not to purchase
because she subsequently learned that a Starbucks was opening across the
street. Here we are more likely to say that an unanticipated change in
circumstances caused Jones to change her mind. And this is so despite the
fact that Jones knew from the beginning—in the sense that she would have
said so if asked—that a Starbucks across the street would cause her to rethink
expanding.
This intuitive distinction between foreground and background conditions is the target of my analysis. This section describes and criticizes two
theories of it. The awareness theory argues that foreground conditions on
a person’s intention are those conditions she is conscious of. The reason
theory maintains that foreground conditions are those whose satisfaction
is a reason for or whose nonsatisfaction is a reason against doing the intended act. Describing the shortcomings of each theory sets the stage for
the planning theory developed in Sections II and III.
The awareness theory holds that the difference between background
and foreground conditions lies in the agent’s awareness of the condition.
Kenneth Campbell provides the following argument:
[A]ll intentions seem to involve a degree of self-awareness. I do not believe
that it is possible to form an intention to do something and, at least at the
period of formation of the intention, be unaware of what it is that one intends
to do. And if this is true of the action it seems to be none the less true of the
conditions to which performance of the action is, in one’s intention, subject.
So I do not see how an intention can have as part of its content a condition
which had not occurred to one.12

12. Kenneth Campbell, Conditional Intention, 2 LEGAL STUD. 77, 89–90 (1982). Jack Meiland
similarly argues that if an agent does not realize that the nonoccurrence of condition C would
affect his decision to X, “C does not enter into his intention at all, although C might become
part of his intention if he realized that C was relevant to the doing of X or to his other purposes.”
JACK W. MEILAND, THE NATURE OF INTENTION 20 (1970).
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On the awareness theory, whether a condition is foreground or background
depends in part on whether the agent happened to consider it. If, when
Jones enters into the contract to purchase the neighboring building, it
occurs to her that Starbucks might open a store nearby and that she would
then choose not to expand, the absence of a new Starbucks is a foreground
condition of her intent to purchase. If she does not happen to consider that
possibility, her intention is at most background-conditional with respect to
a Starbucks opening.
Now, one response to Campbell’s argument is to question its major
premise—that persons are necessarily aware of the content of their intentions. Bratman argues, for example, that an agent can be mistaken about
the details of what she intends.13 The deeper problem with the awareness
theory, however, lies in the underlying conception of what intentions are.
Suppose Jones unconditionally intends to perform the contract to purchase the building adjacent to her coffee shop. If asked, she would admit
that if someone offered her a million dollars to realize her dream of opening
a skydiving school, she would take it and breach the contract to purchase.14
On the awareness theory, so long as the possibility of a million-dollar offer
does not occur to Jones, she can unconditionally intend to purchase the
building, but if it does occur to her, her intention is then conditional. This
is true no matter how unlikely she thinks such an offer and whether or
not her awareness of that possibility inﬂuences her practical deliberations
or behavior. In fact, consideration of the million-dollar-offer hypothetical
would inﬂuence neither. It is practically inert.
We are touching here on a bigger issue: what a theory of intentions is
meant to explain. Certainly there is a difference between an agent who
has reﬂected on the background conditions of her intention and one who
has not. But if that reﬂection does not affect her practical deliberations
or subsequent actions, it belongs to the domain of theoretical, not practical, reason.15 If there is a difference between background and foreground
conditions, we should expect it to be manifest in the role each plays in an
agent’s practical life. The awareness theory points to a difference that does
not make the right sort of difference.
J.P.W. Cartwright advocates another approach. Cartwright maintains that
a foreground condition is a condition “such that its fulﬁllment constitutes
13. Michael E. Bratman, Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical, in SPHERES OF REASON (J.
Timmerman et al. eds., forthcoming) (Sept. 22, 2008 draft) §4, at 12–13, available at
http://philosophy.stanford.edu/download/18446/Bratman IBPT 2008 ﬁnal.pdf.
14. I ask the reader for the sake of the example to grant me that Jones would not be able to
buy her way out of the sales contract.
15. Bratman discusses the difference between intending and having a belief about one’s
intentions in MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, Cognitivism about Practical Reason, 102 ETHICS 117 (1991),
reprinted in FACES OF INTENTION: SELECTED ARTICLES ON INTENTION AND AGENCY 250 (1999), and
in Bratman, Intention, Belief, supra note 13. The difference between intending and ascribing
an intention to oneself is also central to Wilfrid Sellars’s work on intentions. See, e.g., Wilfrid
Sellars, On Reasoning about Values, 17 AM. PHIL. Q. 81, 84 (1980).
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a reason for continuing with the intention and performing the action intended, while its non-fulﬁllment constitutes a reason for not doing these
things.”16 Cartwright then argues that what we intuitively take to be background conditions do not satisfy that criterion. He considers ﬁrst the generic
qualiﬁcation “if nothing prevents me.” Neither the satisfaction nor the nonsatisfaction of such a condition, Cartwright argues, provides the agent with
a reason for or against doing the intended act. “An agent’s belief in his
capacity to Ø cannot be said to be amongst his reasons for Øing because it
is, rather, the necessary background against which talk of reasons for and
against Øing can take place.”17 Cartwright reaches the same conclusion for
“if nothing signiﬁcant alters”:
But . . . “if nothing signiﬁcant alters” amounts in effect to “if I don’t change
my mind.” Now “if I don’t change my mind” is once again not a genuine
condition by the test stated earlier. My not changing my mind cannot be said
to be a reason for not continuing with the intention, since it just is identical
with discontinuing the intention.18

Cartwright concludes that background conditions are not genuine conditions: “The fact that the change of mind is eminently predictable, instantaneous and requires no weighing of pros and cons, may cause it to resemble
the automatic operation of a canceling condition, but the resemblance is
deceptive. It remains for all this a change of mind.”19
There are several problems with this argument. To get at them, I need
to highlight a distinction implicit in it that will also ﬁgure into my own
analysis. An intention might be conditional because the agent has chosen to
act only under certain circumstances or because the agent believes that only
under certain circumstances will she be able to act on it.20 Jones’s intention
to purchase only if she can obtain a construction loan is of the ﬁrst sort:
she could buy the property without the construction loan—and then not
renovate it—but she would not want to. Alternatively, suppose Jones learns
that the city is considering condemning the building to take it for a public
use. Jones’s intent to purchase only if the building is not condemned is of the
16. J.P.W. Cartwright, Conditional Intention, 60 PHIL. STUD. 233, 240 (1990). Donald Davidson
makes a similar suggestion:
[B]ona ﬁde conditions are ones that are reasons for acting that are contemporary with
the intention. . . . Changing his mind is a tricky case, but in general someone is not apt
to view a possible future change of intention as a reason to modify his present intention
unless he thinks the future change will itself be brought about by something he would
now consider a reason.
DONALD DAVIDSON, Intending, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 83, 94–95 (1980).
17. Cartwright, supra note 16, at 240.
18. Id. at 241–242.
19. Id. at 242.
20. This is a ﬁrst, rough take on the distinction. For a more nuanced description of it, see
Section II.B.
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second sort: condemnation would prevent her purchase. I will call chosen
conditions “elective” and conditions on a person’s ability to act “enabling”
conditions.21
The ﬁrst difﬁculty with Cartwright’s argument is that his analysis of background enabling conditions applies pari passu to what we normally consider
foreground conditions. Suppose, again, that Jones intends to buy the building only if it is not condemned. No condemnation would not be a new
reason to purchase the building. Nor would condemnation be a reason
not to buy—it would simply prevent her from doing so.22 This is so no
matter how much Jones attends to the possibility or takes it into account
in her planning—no matter how much she thinks of her intent as conditional. If Cartwright’s theory is correct, there are no foreground enabling
conditions.
While perhaps unintuitive, that result is not necessarily wrong. The surface similarity between our descriptions of enabling and elective conditions
might mask deeper differences, differences that should cause us on reﬂection to say that such conditions are different in kind. If so, perhaps there is
a sense in which elective conditions can be “foreground” or “background”
that does not apply to enabling conditions.
But the reason theory also fails to distinguish foreground elective conditions from background ones. Cartwright equates “if nothing signiﬁcant
alters” with “if I don’t change my mind” to conclude that the former is not
a reason for acting. But these are different propositions. If I am ﬁckle or
self-doubting, I might change my mind even if there has been no relevant
change in circumstances. And the qualiﬁer “signiﬁcant” in “if nothing significant alters” appears designed to pick out just those changed circumstances
that would give me a reason not to act. The better analysis of “I intend to x
if nothing signiﬁcant alters” is along the lines of Ferrero’s:
I intend [given C1 , C2 . . . , to x],

(1)

where “C1 , C2 . . . ” stands for an as-yet-undetermined list of eventualities, the nonoccurrence of which would cause the agent to reconsider
xing.23 On this analysis, “if nothing signiﬁcant alters” does refer to reasons, though it does not yet specify what they are. The reason theory cannot
distinguish such elective background conditions from elective foreground
conditions.
21. Ferrero notes the distinction as well. Ferrero, supra note 10, ¶¶2.2–2.4. While he also
uses the term “enabling conditions,” Ferrero calls “restrictive conditions” what I designate
“elective conditions.”
22. Ferrero suggests that “[t]here is a perfectly acceptable sense in which the satisfaction
of an enabling condition counts as a reason in support of the intended action.” Id. ¶2.4. If so,
this is a rather attenuated sense as compared to elective conditions.
23. Compare Ferrero’s (DS-E). Id. ¶
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Finally, and more generally, a person might elect to act on a condition,
though satisfaction of the condition is not among her reasons for so acting nor its nonsatisfaction a reason for not acting.24 Mark Bittman, a food
columnist for the New York Times, reports that he has a policy of eating “vegan until six.”25 In other words, Bittman has a standing intention to eat
no animal products, subject to a foreground elective condition: that it is
before 6 P.M. Satisfaction of the condition—the fact that it is not yet six—
has nothing to do with Bittman’s reasons for not eating animal products.
Those reasons involve considerations of health and concerns for the environment. The reason for the condition has to do with Bittman’s desire for a
moderate plan he will stick to. While Bittman has reasons for adopting the
conditional intention, the condition itself is not a reason for the intended
act.
The point here touches on themes more fully explored in the next section’s discussion of Bratman’s planning theory. But the central claim can
be stated now: intentions are not reasons but are “framework reasons.” The
difference lies in the fact that intentions “do not compete with desire-belief
reasons, but rather structure the process of weighing such reasons.”26 This
is the more fundamental reason to reject Cartwright’s reason theory.
Both the awareness theory and the reason theory point to real differences
among conditional intentions. Agents sometimes do and sometimes do not
attend to the conditions on their intentions, and some conditions are more
closely tied to an agent’s reasons for acting than are others. But neither
distinction marks the right sort of a difference in how an agent’s intentions
ﬁgure into her cognitive economy. Neither captures the intuitive difference
between foreground and background conditions. Section III argues that a
planning theory does.
II. GROUNDWORK FOR THE PLANNING THEORY
A more satisfactory account of the difference between background and
foreground conditions on a person’s intention requires some preliminary
analytic spadework. First, I need to describe a few pieces of Bratman’s theory of intention, which are deployed in Section III to explain the difference
between background and foreground conditions. Second, it is important
to differentiate between three types of intended conditions: necessary, sufﬁcient, and necessary and sufﬁcient. One might intend to act on any of
these types of conditions, depending on whether the condition is elective
or enabling.

24. Thanks to Gideon Yaffe for emphasizing this point to me.
25. MARK BITTMAN, FOOD MATTERS: A GUIDE TO CONSCIOUS EATING WITH MORE THAN 75 RECIPES
72 (2008).
26. BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, supra note 4, at 34; see also id. at 24–26.
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A. Elements of Bratman’s Planning Theory
Intentions, like other mental states, can be identiﬁed as such by their function in a person’s reasoning and behavior. Bratman observes that futuredirected intentions are like plans that the agent adopts both to guide her behavior and to coordinate it with others.27 Intentions have two characteristic
features that allow them to serve those functions. First, and most obviously,
A’s intention at t0 to x at t1 tends to cause A to x at t1 . Second, A’s intention
at t0 to x at t1 structures A’s deliberations and actions between t0 and t1 . The
ﬁrst feature is perhaps the more familiar one. Exclusive focus on an intention’s causal efﬁcacy with respect to the intended act suggests the billiardball picture that I describe in the introductory paragraphs. Section III
describes how it can also give rise to the illusion that there is no intrinsic
difference between background and foreground conditions. Less familiar
is the role that future-oriented intentions play in structuring an agent’s ongoing deliberation and behavior. This section provides a quick overview of
Bratman’s theory of this function. I argue in Section III that it is here that
the difference between background and foreground conditions plays out.
Practical reasoning is a norm-governed activity. To describe the governing
norms is to describe both how rational agents should deliberate and how
competent agents do deliberate. That is, the relevant norms not only are
the rules of practical reasoning but also depict the reasoning habits of
competent agents. Having an intention requires having the capacity to
adhere to the relevant norms, which means having the right deliberative
habits.
Bratman identiﬁes two norms that govern how A’s intention to x should inﬂuence A’s practical deliberation: means-end coherence and consistency.28
For the purposes of the analysis here, I ignore a third constraint, agglomerativity, which requires that an agent’s intention to x and her intention to y be
such that she could also intend x and y.29 The consequences of a conditional
intention for agglomerativity are similar to those for consistency.
Means-end coherence requires that if A intends to x, she also eventually
adopt intentions to accomplish the necessary means of xing. Stated otherwise, means-end coherence requires, “roughly, that it not be true that one
intends E, believes that E requires that one intend means M, and yet not
intend M.”30 This constraint goes hand in hand with the fact that intentions
are typically but partial plans. Jones’s intent to expand into the neighboring storefront does not yet decide how the new space will be designed,
who will do the construction work, whether her coffee shop will remain
open during construction, and so forth. In order to realize that intention,
27. This theory is laid out in id., passim.
28. See id. at 32–33.
29. See id. at 134–138; Gideon Yaffe, Trying, Intending, and Attempted Crimes, 32 PHIL. TOPICS
505, 512–514 (2004); Ferrero, supra note 10, ¶5.1.
30. Bratman, Intention, Belief, supra note 4, at 1.
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Jones must eventually intend requisite means of expanding. Means-end coherence therefore “provides rational pressure for the addition of further
intentions.”31
The consistency requirement “provides constraints on what further intentions may be introduced,” be they intentions to accomplish the means
of xing or other projects.32 It requires that “one’s intentions, taken together
with one’s beliefs, ﬁt together into a consistent model of one’s future.”33 If
Jones intends to expand the coffee shop, she cannot consistently also intend to maintain its interior layout unchanged. Whether two intentions are
consistent often depends on the agent’s other beliefs. Thus if Jones believes
that expanding her business will require hiring more employees, her intention to expand is incompatible with an intention to shrink her workforce.
If she believes the expanded business will not require more workers, those
intentions are compatible.
These two rational constraints—means-end coherence and consistency—
ground Bratman’s claim that intentions do not so much provide an agent
with ﬁrst-order reasons to act as frame her ongoing practical deliberation.
Settling on an intention to x provides a second-order reason to exclude
from one’s deliberation options that are inconsistent with xing and creates
second-order reasons to adopt further intentions concerning the means
of xing. Intentions therefore “provide special kinds of reasons—framework
reasons—whose role is to help determine the relevance and admissibility
of options. These reasons do not compete with desire-belief reasons, but
rather structure the process of weighing such reasons.”34
The other necessary piece of Bratman’s theory is his technical concept
of acceptance. Intentions tie into beliefs or belief-like attitudes at several
points. First and perhaps most familiarly, a person’s practical reasoning is
premised on her beliefs. My reasoning from a desire for a snack to an intent to go to the refrigerator passes through my belief that the refrigerator
contains food. Second, having an intention to x requires something like
a belief that one is able to x and is closely related to the belief that one
will x. Third, the demands of both means-end coherence and consistency
depend on the agent’s beliefs. I have already mentioned that “consistency”
refers not only to logical consistency (A cannot intend both to x and to
not-x) but to compossible realizability given the agent’s beliefs about the
world (Jones’s intention to reduce her workforce is inconsistent with an
intention to expand her business because she believes expansion will require more employees). Means-end coherence is equally belief-dependent.
Jones’s intention to hire Nathan to do the construction ﬁlls in her intention
to expand because she believes that expanding requires renovation of the
31.
32.
33.
34.

BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, supra note 4, at 33.
Id. at 33.
Bratman, Intention, Belief, supra note 13, at 1.
BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 4, at 34.
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new space, that she cannot do the work herself, that Nathan can, and so
forth.
But belief-type commitments do not function in the same way in our practical and in our theoretical reasoning.35 Bratman suggests we reserve the
term “belief” for attitudes subject to the requirements of theoretical reasoning and use “acceptance” to denote belief-like attitudes subject only to
the requirements of practical reasoning. For the purposes of the argument
below, it is enough to observe two differences between belief and acceptance. First, in theoretical reasoning we often assign our beliefs a degree
of certainty, though in our practical reasoning we might treat the content
of those attitudes as given or simply true. Thus while Jones knows that
buildings occasionally catch ﬁre and burn down, in deciding to expand her
business into the neighboring storefront she brackets such considerations
and assumes the space will be available. There are a number of reasons
to accept a proposition in one’s practical reasoning that on reﬂection one
would think is subject to some uncertainty. These include simpliﬁcation,
asymmetries in the cost of errors, and the demands of social cooperation.36
The net effect is that “practical pressures can make it reasonable of me to
accept that p in a certain practical context even if it is not reasonable of me
to assign p a probability of 1 in my theoretical reﬂections.”37
Second, whether one accepts a proposition in one’s practical reasoning
depends on the context. For the purpose of deciding whether to expand
her business, Jones reasonably accepts that she will be able to use the space;
when thinking about whether to buy insurance, she allows that accidents
happen. The practical pressures for accepting a proposition:
are context-relative in the sense that they apply in only some of the practical
contexts in which this proposition is relevant. Such pressures can sometimes
make it reasonable for an agent to accept a proposition in a given context,
even though she reasonably would not (or, indeed, does not) accept that
proposition in a different context in which it is relevant.38

Beliefs, in contrast, are not context relative. Theoretical reasoning requires
that if I have a belief when reasoning about one matter, I maintain that
belief when reasoning about another.

35. See MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context, in FACES OF
INTENTION: SELECTION ESSAYS ON INTENTION AND AGENCY, at 15 (1999). Bratman also discusses
the basic idea in BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, supra note 4, at 36–37.
36. Bratman also discusses acceptances tied to special relationships to others, such as loyalty,
and the acceptance of propositions that are preconditions of practical reasoning, such as that
I have a free will. See BRATMAN, Practical Reasoning, supra note 35, at 21–26.
37. Id. at 29.
38. Id. at 20.

http://journals.cambridge.org

120

GREGORY KLASS

B. Strictly Conditional, Conditioned, and Biconditional Intentions
I turn now to the structure of conditional intentions. It is a familiar fact
that the grammar of natural language does not always mirror the logical
structure of the propositions we express in it. This is no less true of reports of
conditional intentions. Suppose Jones tells the manager of her coffee shop,
“I intend to expand into the space next door if I can get a construction loan.”
In context, it is reasonable to interpret Jones as saying that she intends to
expand if she gets the loan, and that she intends not to expand if she does
not. Despite its surface grammar, her statement reports a biconditional
intention. She intends that getting a loan shall be a necessary and sufﬁcient
condition of expansion. She intends to expand if and only if she gets a loan.
In analyzing A’s conditional intention to x, it is useful to distinguish A’s
attitude toward the conditions under which she shall x from her possible
attitudes toward xing as such—whether she prefers xing to not-xing, intends
to x, intends to try to x, and so forth. To keep with the example, Jones’s
intention to expand the coffee shop if and only if she gets a construction
loan does not of itself tell us whether she wishes or intends to try to expand.
In the context of the above exchange, it seems that she does. But we can
imagine other scenarios in which Jones does not want to expand but intends
to do so if she gets a construction loan—say, where she has entered into a
contract to purchase conditioned on obtaining the loan, and she now wants
to be relieved of the obligation.
This section focuses on the different attitudes an agent A might have
toward the conditions under which she shall x. My claim is that an agent
might intend a state of affairs as a sufﬁcient condition on performing an act
(A intends to x if C), as a necessary condition of performing it (A intends to
x only if C), or as a necessary and sufﬁcient condition (A intends to x if and
only if C). For the moment I leave it open whether these connectives—“if,”
“only if,” and “if and only if”—should be read to accord with the logic of
material implication. I argue in Section III that the truth-functional reading at least captures conditional intentions’ role in organizing an agent’s
practical reasoning.
I will call intentions whose content includes sufﬁcient conditions “strictly
conditional,” intentions that include necessary conditions “conditioned,”
and intentions that include necessary and sufﬁcient conditions “biconditional.” This typology is not deﬁned with reference to the distinctions
between foreground and background or between elective and enabling
conditions.39 The different possible characteristics of a condition, however,
interact and limit one another. In this section I describe how elective and
then enabling conditions might or might not fall under one or another of
these logical types. The relation to background and foreground conditions
is a topic of Section III.
39. Ferrero generally assumes that elective conditions are intended as sufﬁcient conditions,
while enabling conditions are necessary ones. See Ferrero, supra note 10, ¶¶2.2–2.3.
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An elective condition on an intention is not imposed by the world but
comes from the agent herself. In some instances an elective condition is a
matter of a conscious choice: the agent has decided that the relevant state
of affairs shall be a condition of performing the intended act. In others,
the condition is adopted without deliberation or reﬂection, as the result
of broader policy-based intentions or simply as a matter of habit. In either
case, the condition is not the mere corollary of a belief that one will be able
to perform the intended act only if it the condition is satisﬁed. This is what
distinguishes elective from enabling conditions.
An elective condition might be located in the antecedent or the consequent of a conditional intention or in both; that is, elective conditions can
appear in strictly conditional, conditioned, or biconditional intentions.
Sometimes the surface grammar of “A intends to x if C” matches the
speaker’s meaning, and the sentence reports that A intends that C shall
be a sufﬁcient but not necessary condition of A’s xing. This is commonly
the case when C is a reason to do the intended act. Jones might intend,
for example, to expand the coffee shop if but not only if a planned movie
theater opens down the street. In that case, she has made a decision that
the movie theater opening shall be a sufﬁcient condition of expanding but
she has not yet decided what to do if the movie theater does not open—if
the condition is not satisﬁed. We can formally represent the content of such
an intention by using the “→” connective, stipulating for the moment that
it should not be read as a material conditional but as a generic implication
operator. Where A intends that C shall be a sufﬁcient but not necessary
condition of A’s xing, the structure of her intention is:
A intends (C → x).40

(2)

I suggest reserving the term “strictly conditional” for intentions that have
the form (2).
A strictly conditional intention need not be combined with any other
attitude to effect the act in question. A strictly conditional intention to x if
C sufﬁces to explain the agent’s xing when C pertains. That said, an agent
who intends to x if C might have other attitudes that further illuminate her
disposition toward xing. Thus A might also intend to x if D, whether or not C
pertains. Jones might intend to expand her business if the city council passes
a measure to create a business improvement district, whether or not the
cinema opens. If the agent has control or inﬂuence over whether C pertains,
her attitude toward C or her other attitudes toward xing can also be highly
informative. In the examples, Jones might mean to do everything in her
power to ensure satisfaction of the condition—write a letter encouraging the
developers to open the cinema, lobby the city council. In other situations,
40. A more rigorous formalization would put a proposition on each side of the operator;
that is, (2) should be understood as shorthand for “A intends (C → A xes).”
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an agent might prefer not-C or not-x, and therefore intend to try to prevent
satisfaction of an elective sufﬁcient condition.
Alternatively, an agent A might intend that C be a necessary but not
sufﬁcient condition of her xing; that is, she might intend to x only if elective
condition C is satisﬁed without yet deciding whether she shall x if C. Thus
Jones might decide that she will perform her promise to purchase only if
her architect determines the space is suitable, though even then she might
choose not to buy it. Here the structure of Jones’s intention is:
A intends (x → C).

(3)

I will use the term “conditioned” for intentions of form (3). The clearest
natural-language description of an elective conditioned intention is often
its contrapositive: A intends not to x if not-C (Jones intends not to purchase
if the architect does not report the space is suitable). Elective conditioned
intentions commonly appear in policy-based intentions, such as an intention
never to swim on a full stomach or never to drive drunk, which have the
forms: A intends (swim → A has an empty stomach) and A intends (drive
→ A is sober).41
If we read conditional intentions as operating according to the logic of
material implication—and I argue in Section III that we should with respect
to their consequences for the agent’s deliberations—the equivalence of the
contrapositive means that every strictly conditional intention is equivalent
to a conditioned intention, and vice versa. A’s intention (C → x) is functionally equivalent to her intention (not-x → not-C), and A’s intention (x
→ C) is functionally equivalent to her intention (not-C → not-x). I believe
this is correct. A formal analysis of the rational constraints that an agent’s
intentions impose on her deliberations could do without one or the other
category. Separating them out, however, will be useful in analyzing the different ways in which conditions ﬁgure into practical reasoning. And the
opacity of propositional attitudes means that an agent who reports a conditioned intention might not admit to the corresponding strictly conditional
intention, or vice versa.
Unlike strictly conditional intentions, a conditioned intention as such
does not tell us the agent’s attitude toward the act should the condition
be satisﬁed. A’s intention (x → C) does not say what A plans to do if C
pertains.42 This is most obviously the case in policy-based intentions. My
intention to swim only on an empty stomach, together with the fact that it
41. Policy-based intentions can also be strictly conditional or biconditional.
42. Luca Ferrero suggests in correspondence that this might mean that “conditioned intentions” are not really intentions as the agent has not yet decided what to do in scenarios in
which the condition is satisﬁed but only in scenarios in which the condition is not satisﬁed.
This would explain why the contrapositive is the more natural expression. According to this objection, only strictly conditioned intentions are true intentions, while what I call “conditioned
intentions” are mere constraints on an agent’s future deliberations. This objection is of a piece
with Ferrero’s rejection of the truth-functional reading of conditional intentions. Ferrero
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has been two hours since I last ate, does not determine whether I intend to
swim. But the point also applies to one-shot conditioned intentions. Jones
intends that a favorable architect’s report shall be only a necessary, not
a sufﬁcient, condition of purchasing. Consequently, as distinguished from
strictly conditional intentions, A’s conditioned intention to x only if C and
C’s pertaining are never a sufﬁcient explanation of A’s subsequently xing.
For that we must refer to A’s other attitudes, like her intention to x or her
intention to try to x.
Often more salient than either strictly conditional or conditioned intentions are elective biconditional intentions. A biconditional intention has
the structure:
A intends (x ↔ C).

(4)

So interpreted, Jones’s statement, “I intend to expand the coffee shop if I can
get a loan,” reports that Jones intends to expand if she obtains a loan and not
to expand if she does not. That is, Jones intends that getting a loan shall be a
necessary and sufﬁcient condition of expanding. A’s elective biconditional
intention to x if and only if C is sufﬁcient to explain the fact that A xes when
C pertains. Like other conditional intentions, however, an agent’s other
attitudes toward xing might further illuminate the biconditional intention’s
place in her practical reasoning.
Enabling conditions exhibit less variety in their logical structure. An enabling condition is a condition of the possibility of performing the intended
act. By deﬁnition, then, enabling conditions are always necessary conditions.
It does not follow, however, that they can appear in conditioned intentions. A
conditioned intention has form (3) above: A intends (x → C). Substituting
an enabling condition for C in (3) produces an ill-formed proposition. What
a person intends is within her control and is often a matter of decision. We
do not have the ability to control or decide the conditions of the possibility
of our acts. Recall Jones’s intent to purchase the building only if it is not
condemned. Jones does not intend to purchase only if there is no condemnation; the world forces that condition on her. Rather than substituting in

would allow that A might intend (not-C → not-x) but rationally not intend the contrapositive,
(x → C).
I am not convinced that a conditioned intention expressed as such is not an intention,
although of course I grant that it does not specify what the agent shall do if the condition is
satisﬁed. The question is in part a semantic one: How should we use the word “intention”?
Conditioned intentions are plans that constrain one’s future deliberations and actions. I
argue in Section III that they do so in ways that parallel strictly conditional and biconditional
intentions. And because I advocate a truth-functional reading of conditional intentions, I am
willing to grant that a conditioned intention is equivalent for the purposes of the agent’s
deliberations to the strictly conditional contrapositive—which would make it odd to say that
it is not an intention. All of this recommends, to my mind, a use of “intention” that is more
inclusive.
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(3), we should therefore say:
A believes or accepts (x → C).

(5)

A cannot intend that enabling condition C is a necessary condition of her
xing, though she can believe or accept that it is.
If an agent has an intention with respect to xing, it will in all likelihood
include an intention to x if she can. This might be because A intends to
x or intends to try to x.43 Thus, absent other conditions or considerations,
Jones’s intention to try to buy the building, together with her belief that she
can do so only if it is not condemned, entails an intent to purchase if it is
not condemned. That is, Jones has an attitude of the form:
A believes (x → C) and A intends (C → x).

(6)

In other contexts, an agent might have an attitude of form (6) for reasons
other than an intent to x or to try to x. I might intend to attend a faculty
meeting if it occurs but hope that it does not happen and even encourage
the dean to cancel it. I am not trying to attend the faculty meeting, though I
have an intention of form (6). In the analysis that follows, I assume that (6)
describes the minimal content of an intention that involves an enabling condition. While not equivalent to a biconditional intention, it is close enough
for my purposes. I therefore treat (4), A intends (x ↔ C), as shorthand for
(6) as well.
The fact that enabling conditions appear only in something like biconditional intentions marks a signiﬁcant difference between enabling and
elective conditions. An elective condition might be intended as a sufﬁcient,
as a necessary, or as a necessary and sufﬁcient condition of acting; that is,
an intention subject to an elective condition might be strictly conditional,
conditioned, or biconditional. In contrast, enabling conditions, insofar as
they ﬁgure into the content of an agent’s attitudes, are always believed to
be necessary and can therefore be intended only as sufﬁcient conditions of
acting. Intentions that include enabling conditions in their scope are always
biconditional in the sense described above.
III. A PLANNING THEORY OF FOREGROUND AND
BACKGROUND CONDITIONS
The planning theory holds that future-directed intentions have two characteristic features. An intention to x is the sort of thing that tends, ﬁrst, to
43. If A accepts the satisfaction of C in the sense described in the next section, then she
might simply intend to x. If she does not accept the satisfaction of C, then she might rationally
be able only to try to x. For complications in the distinction between intending and trying, see
BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, supra note 4, at 113–22; Carl Ginet, Trying to Act, in FREEDOM AND
DETERMINISM 89 (J.K. Campbell et al. ed., 2004); Yaffe, Trying, supra note 29.
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cause the agent to x and, second, to inﬂuence in the mean time the agent’s
practical deliberations and other actions in accordance with the norms of
consistency and means-end coherence.
Attending only to the ﬁrst characteristic can make it appear as if the distinction between background and foreground conditions has more to do
with what is known about the agent’s practical attitudes than the attitudes
themselves. Let Pi represent the probability of Jones realizing an unconditional intention to perform under the hypothetical contract to purchase, αF
the probability that she will obtain a construction loan, and αB the probability that a Starbucks will not open. Jones’s foreground-conditional intention to perform if and only if she gets a loan entails that the probability of
her performing is αF (Pi ). A background condition that Starbucks not move
into the neighborhood entails that the probability is αB (Pi ). With respect to
performance of the intended act, background and foreground conditions
appear to have the same sorts of consequences.
Seeing this, one might conclude that the difference between background
and foreground conditions lies not in underlying attitudes but in what the
agent or her interlocutor knows about them. Hence the awareness theory,
according to which foreground conditions are just those conditions the
agent realizes or attends to. Alternatively, one might look to the conversational logic of ﬁrst-person reports.44 On this approach, which is implicit
in Ayres and my earlier work, background conditions are those conditions
within the range of the speaker and hearer’s mutual expectations, while
foreground conditions are those about which the speaker reporting her
intention knows more than the hearer.45
Suppose Jones tells her manager that she intends simpliciter to expand
the business in six months. Both know that a Starbucks opening across the
street is the sort of event that might cause Jones to cancel those plans. So
long as Jones does not think a Starbucks is particularly likely, she has no reason to communicate that condition. But if she has heard that Starbucks has
been scouting locations nearby, she might mention the condition to inform
the manager indirectly of that fact. Similarly, if the manager has no reason to
know that Jones will need a loan to make the necessary improvements, Jones
would then have a reason to tell him of that condition on her intent to expand. On this theory of conversational pragmatics, background conditions
on an expressed intention are those that correspond to the speaker and
hearer’s mutual background understanding, while foreground conditions
are conditions about which the speaker knows more than the hearer.
While there is something to the pragmatic theory as a description of the
norms governing expressions of intent, it is not a satisfactory account of the
difference between background- and foreground-conditional intentions.
44. The theory I describe in this and the next paragraphs builds on David Pears’s analysis
of implicature for expressions of intent in Pears, Intention and Belief, in ESSAYS ON DAVIDSON:
ACTIONS AND EVENTS 75, 84–88 (Bruce Vermazen & Merrill B. Hintikka eds., 1985).
45. See AYRES & KLASS, supra note 3, at 26–29.
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Attention to the other function of future-directed intentions—structuring
an agent’s practical deliberations in accord with consistency and means-end
coherence—suggests that the distinction refers to a difference in kind. This
section argues that this is the difference between an agent who accepts the
satisfaction or nonsatisfaction of the condition and an agent who accepts
neither. Background conditions on an agent’s intention are those conditions she accepts in her practical deliberations as satisﬁed or nonsatisﬁed,
while foreground conditions are those whose satisfaction the agent treats
as an open question. This is similar to an approach advocated by Luca Ferrero.46 Drawing the line at acceptance of the condition accounts for the
different ways background- and foreground-conditional intentions shape
an agent’s practical reasoning.
The analysis below uses the formal notation developed in Section II to
distinguish between strictly conditional, conditioned, and biconditional intentions. To mark whether a condition is background or foreground, I attach
the subscripts “F” and “B” to the connectives. For example, “A intends (C
→F x)” should be read to say that A has a foreground strictly conditional
intention to x if C, while “A intends (C ↔B x)” says that A has a background
biconditional intention to x if and only if C.
My thesis is that a background condition is one that the agent accepts
as satisﬁed or as not satisﬁed. The analysis below focuses on the practical
consequences of accepting the condition as satisﬁed. Because I advocate a
truth-functional reading of the deliberative consequences of conditional intentions, which permits substitution of the contrapositive, the argument can
easily be extended to cover acceptance of the condition’s nonsatisfaction.47
I consider the implications of acceptance of the condition for consistency
and for means-end coherence in turn.
46. See Ferrero, supra note 10, ¶¶4.2–4.3, 6.3, 7.2, 8.2.
47. As an example, suppose A intends (x → C) and that A accepts that C is not satisﬁed. On
the proposed theory, her conditioned intention (x → C) is therefore background-conditional.
Because A accepts that C is not the case, in that practical context she should also accept that
not-C is the case; that is, she should accept satisfaction of the condition of her functionally
equivalent strictly conditional intention (not-C → not-x), which is therefore also backgroundconditional. It is not difﬁcult to show that the rational constraints imposed by A’s intention
(x → C) where A accepts the nonsatisfaction of C are the same as the rational constraints
imposed by an intention (not-C → not-x) where A accepts the satisfaction of not-C. Similar
arguments can be constructed for strictly conditional and biconditional intentions.
This is not a merely technical point; it corresponds to how we describe intentions. Suppose
Jones has a policy-based intention of donating found money to charity. If she reﬂects on the
matter, she might decide that if she ever wins the lottery, she will give the money away. Because
she never buys lottery tickets, she accepts that the condition of winning the lottery will not
be satisﬁed. But her attitude is not inert. Though it creates no rational pressure to intend the
means of donating any winnings (such as choosing a charity), it imposes consistency constraints
on Jones’s practical reasoning. The attitude entails, for example, that it would be irrational for
Jones to plan on funding renovations to her coffee shop by playing the lottery (and not only
because of the low probability of winning). Jones’s intention to give any lottery winnings to
charity is background-conditional because she accepts the nonsatisfaction of the condition.
Thanks to Luca Ferrero for pointing out the complications raised by the contrapositive on
my approach.
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A. Consistency
I begin with an obvious case: a foreground biconditional intention, such as
Jones’s intention to purchase if and only if she obtains a construction loan.
On the proposed theory, characterizing the condition as foreground says
that Jones accepts neither that she will get a loan nor that she will not get
one. This is intuitively plausible. There are two reasons for Jones to mention
the condition in conversation or attend to it in her practical reasoning: her
belief that she might not get a loan and her decision that if she does not,
she will not perform her promise to purchase. That is, Jones is planning
for two possible futures, or two scenarios:48 one in which she obtains a loan
and one in which she does not. She intends in the ﬁrst to perform and in
the second not to do so.
The fact that an agent treats the condition in her biconditional intention
as an open question has obvious implications for the consistency of her
practical attitudes.49 For example, while Jones’s simple intention to expand
the coffee shop would exclude a plan to keep the interior unchanged, her
foreground biconditional intention does not. She expects that if she does
not obtain a loan, she will not expand, in which case she might keep the
coffee shop as it is. Her foreground biconditional intention to expand (if
and only if she gets a loan) permits her to intend conditionally to keep the
layout the same (only if she does not obtain a loan).
This suggests a truth-functional reading of the consistency consequences
of foreground biconditional intentions. A’s behavior complies with her intent (x ↔F C) in two possible states of affairs: C pertains and A xes, and
C does not pertain and A does not x. Thus while A’s unconditional intention to x excludes from A’s deliberation plans that entail A not-xing, A’s
foreground biconditional intention to x if and only if C excludes from her
deliberations only plans that entail (a) A xing and not-C, and (b) A not-xing
and C. This analysis does not depend on whether the condition is elective
or enabling. An intention to purchase the building if and only if the city
does not condemn it is of the same structure and has similar consequences
for the consistency of Jones’s deliberations. (It will be recalled that in these
cases, one direction of the biconditional is not an intention but a belief or
acceptance regarding the conditions of the possibility of acting.)
The truth-functional reading also captures the consistency constraints of
strictly conditional and conditioned intentions. Jones’s foreground strictly
conditional intention to expand the coffee shop if (but not only if) the
movie theater opens excludes from her deliberations plans in which the
theater opens and she does not expand but leaves open for her deliberative
consideration states of affairs in which (a) it opens and she expands, (b) it
does not open and she does not expand, and (c) it does not open and she
nonetheless expands. Similarly, Jones’s foreground conditioned intention
48. See Yaffe, Conditional Intent, supra note 8, at 292–293.
49. See id. at 294–295; Ferrero, supra note 10, ¶5.1 n.37.
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to expand only if (but perhaps not if) her architect conﬁrms the building’s
suitability excludes from her deliberations only plans that entail expanding against the architect’s advice. It permits the consideration of possible
futures in which (a) the architect reports that the space is suitable and
she expands, (b) he reports that it is suitable and she does not expand, or
(c) he reports that it is unsuitable and she does not expand.
My claim here is that a truth-functional reading of the content of
foreground-conditional intentions captures the consistency demands they
impose. There is an argument that this is too permissive—that this reading does not describe all the ways that conditional intentions constrain an
agent’s deliberations. The argument turns on situations in which satisfaction
of the condition is within the agent’s control.50 Consider a biconditional
intention of the form: A intends (C ↔F x). On the truth-functional reading of the biconditional, not-C and not-x together establish the truth of
“(C ↔F x).” If C is within A’s control, the truth-functional analysis suggests
that A can realize her biconditional intention by preventing the satisfaction of C and then not xing. And this can seem wrong. Suppose Jones
intends to purchase if and only if she obtains a construction loan. It seems
odd to say that she might realize such an intention by not applying for a
loan and then not purchasing. Yet that is what the truth-functional reading entails. Similar intuitions apply to strictly conditional and conditioned
intentions.51

50. See Hector Neri Castañeda, Some Reﬂections on Wilfrid Sellars’ Theory of Intention, in ACTION,
KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY: CRITICAL STUDIES IN HONOR OF WILFRID SELLARS 27, 34–35 (H.N.
Castañeda ed., 1975).
Ferrero advances a different argument against a truth-functional reading: that it does not
capture what it means to carry out an intention.
The only way in which a conditional intention [to ϕ IF C] can be genuinely carried out is by
ϕ-ing in those circumstances when C obtains by the time of the intended action. There is
nothing that counts as carrying out a conditional intention when, by the time of action, C
can no longer obtain. . . . The alleged discharging of a conditional intention when C can
no longer obtain would not amount to a practical achievement.
Ferrero, supra note 10, ¶2.8; see generally id. ¶¶2.5–3.2.
My claim here concerns only the deliberative constraints that conditional intentions impose.
The argument is not designed to show that a truth-functional reading captures every aspect
of conditional intentions—though it would be an important piece of such a showing. Still,
I am not persuaded by Ferrero’s argument, which I think proves too much. Suppose that
I unconditionally intend to stop smoking and that shortly after I adopt the intention, the
government bans the sale of tobacco products. I can no longer smoke. In this case, as in
Ferrero’s example, the world has conspired to realize the object of my intention without any
effort by me. This does not mean that I did not intend to stop smoking. It rather reﬂects the
fact that carrying out an intention, whether conditional or not, requires more than moving into
a state of the world in which the propositional object is true.
51. Thus it might seem strange to say that Jones might realize an intention to expand if the
theater opens (a strictly conditional intention) by taking actions to prevent it from opening,
or odd to say that Jones could realize her intention to expand only if her architect approves
of the space (a conditioned intention) by going out of her way to convince the architect that
it does not suit her needs.
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These intuitions, however, are context-dependent. Consider the intentions involved in contingency planning. Suppose I fully intend to write a
paper for an upcoming conference. Because I recognize that I might not
ﬁnish it in time, I adopt an intention that if the new paper is not yet ﬁnished
(an elective condition), I will present an older one. My strictly conditional
intention is: Klass intends (I have not ﬁnished new paper →F present old
paper). In this situation I might do my best to falsify the antecedent without
lapsing into irrationality. One can construct similar examples involving enabling conditions. Thus imagine a loving niece who means to do everything
in her power to keep her rich uncle alive yet plans that should she inherit
from him, she will take the trip to Paris she has always dreamed of. Her
biconditional intention with respect to Paris is: Niece intends (uncle dies
↔F go to Paris). Yet here too we would allow that she might rationally intend
to prevent satisfaction of the condition.
My suggestion is that our intuitions in all of these cases are driven not
by the conditional intention per se but by the agent’s reasons for adopting
it, by her other intentions, and by the broader plans or policies in which
the conditional intention ﬁts. Consider again Jones’s intention to purchase
if and only if she obtains a construction loan. If she wants to expand, she
might adopt the biconditional intention because she wants to purchase
the neighboring storefront and judges that it will not be worth anything
to her if she cannot pay to renovate it. But suppose the sales contract
contains a contingency clause providing that if Jones cannot get a loan she
is not required to purchase, and she wants to get out of the deal because a
Starbucks is opening across the street. In these circumstances, Jones might
reason that the only way to get out of the contract without incurring liability
for breach is to do her best not to obtain a loan.52 Jones’s intent to purchase
is still biconditional, but now she is attempting to defeat the condition.
I am arguing here for a thin conception of intentions, according to
which intentions are individuated by the consistency, means-end-coherence,
and other rational demands they impose on an agent’s deliberations, but
not by the agent’s reasons for adopting them or the broader plans or
projects in which they ﬁgure.53 On this thin conception, Jones’s foregroundconditional intention to purchase if and only if she obtains a loan is the same
whether she adopts it because she intends to try to expand and believes she
52. Jones is ignorant of the contractual duty of good faith.
53. This claim is similar to Wilfrid Sellars’s comments on the difference between the “logic,
strictu sensu, of intentions” and the conceptual truth that some states of affairs “belong in their
content by virtue of being believed to be the case or about to be the case,” while others “are
considered by the agent to be ‘up to me.’ ” Wilfrid Sellars, Conditional Promises and Conditional
Intentions (Including a Reply to Castañeda), in AGENT, LANGUAGE, AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE
WORLD 195, 213 (J. Tomberlin ed., 1983). Sellars argues that the latter differences result from
the particular reasoning that produces the intention. Id. at 217–219. It is also worth keeping in
mind Sellars’s suggestion that our intuitions in these cases sometimes concern “not the logic of
intentions as such, but the logic (in a suitably broad sense) of conditional commitments,” which
one can undertake with an expression of intent. Id. at 206.
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needs the loan to do so or because she wants to get out of the sales contract and thinks being denied a loan is her best exit strategy. While the
different reasons for adopting the biconditional intention impose different
constraints on Jones’s deliberations, those constraints are not part of the
intention itself.54
This is not to say that a thicker conception of intentions, according to
which Jones’s two conditional intentions are not functionally equivalent, is
impossible or incoherent. But to individuate intentions with reference to
the agent’s reasons for holding them would be to rob the concept of much
of its analytic value. By distinguishing intentions from those reasons, we
identify an attitude that plays a distinctive role in our practical reasoning.
Such intentions constrain an agent’s deliberation and inﬂuence her action
in a way that is rational, without requiring reasons to enter into her decisions
every step along the way.55 And even if we chose the thicker conception and
decided to individuate intentions in light of agent’s reasons for adopting
them, we would still want a way of identifying what is common between
attitudes that the thinner conception treats as the same; that is, we would
still want something like the thin conception of intentions with its truthfunctional reading of a foreground condition’s consistency consequences.
Finally, as becomes clear in Section IV, the legal importance of a promisor’s
foreground-conditional intent to perform turns in part on cases in which
the promisor intends to realize that intention by preventing satisfaction of
the condition, as permitted by the truth-functional reading.
The last several paragraphs have taken us fairly deep into the analytic
weeds. While the details differ when satisfaction of the condition is under
an agent’s control, on both the thin and thick conceptions, foreground
conditions on an agent’s intention have the same sorts of consistency consequences: they relax the consistency demands the intention would otherwise impose, permitting the agent to consider plans that under certain
circumstances entail not performing the act in question. With respect to
consistency, this is the core difference between a foreground-conditional
and an unconditional intention.
What of the consistency implications of background conditions? On the
proposed theory, an intention is background-conditional if it is conditional
and the agent accepts the condition’s satisfaction or its nonsatisfaction.
Acceptance differs from belief in that consistency does not require an agent
who accepts S in one context to accept S in others. In considering whether
to purchase the building next door, it is rational for Jones to accept that
it will serve her purposes; in deciding whether to buy ﬁre insurance, it is
rational for her to recognize that accidents happen. That said, consistency
would seem to require at least that an agent who accepts S in one context
54. This thesis marks another point where my approach differs from Ferrero’s. Ferrero
would analyze the content of a contingency plan, for example, as including the fact that it is
subordinated to a different, primary pursuit. Ferrero, supra note 10, ¶6.6 n. 60.
55. See, e.g., BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, supra note 4, at 28–35, 64–70, 87–91.
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not accept not-S in others. It would be irrational for Jones to accept, when
deciding whether to buy, that she will be able to expand into the building,
and then decide to insure it because she expects it to burn down. It is
one thing to recognize, on reﬂection or in other practical deliberations,
that one’s practical assumptions might be wrong; it is another to believe or
accept in other contexts that they are wrong. The former is rational; the
latter, irrational.56
If this is right, background conditions do not relax consistency constraints
in the same way that foreground conditions do. Suppose A has a (strictly
conditional) intention to x if C—A intends (C →B x)—or a (biconditional)
intention to x if and only if C—A intends (C ↔B x). In either case, A’s
acceptance of C excludes from her deliberation any course of action that
entails not-xing. Any state of affairs in which A does not x will entail not-C,
which ex hypothesi is incompatible with A’s acceptance of C. In contrast
to similar foreground conditions, the consistency constraints imposed by a
background strictly conditional or background biconditional intention to x
are no less stringent than those imposed by an unconditional intention to
x. Acceptance of the condition has different implications for conditioned
intentions. A conditioned intention as such does not yet tell us the agent’s
attitude with respect to the act upon satisfaction of the condition. If A intends to x only if C—A intends (x →B C)—her acceptance of C renders that
intention compatible with both xing and not-xing. A background conditioned intention by itself imposes no consistency constraints on the agent’s
further deliberations with respect to the act in question.
This is not to say that background conditions play no role in consistency
evaluations. As Ferrero observes, A’s background belief that C is a necessary
enabling condition of her xing—in my notation, her belief (x →B C)—partly
determines which other intentions are consistent with her intention to x.
Suppose Jones believes that she will have the money to purchase the building
next door only if the coffee shop remains in business. If Jones accepts that
the coffee shop will stay in business and intends to make the purchase, the
background condition renders her intent to do so incompatible with a new
plan to close the coffee shop. “[T]o determine whether two intentions can
be agglomerated, we have to see whether there is any incompatibility in
their preconditions. If there is an incompatibility, the pursuit of one plan
sooner or later is going to make the pursuit of the other impossible.”57
Ferrero makes this point for enabling conditions, but it applies equally
to elective ones. Thus suppose Jones could pay for the purchase out of
her own pocket but has a policy of never using personal funds to pay
for business expenses. This policy, together with the above belief, entails
an electively conditional intention to buy the building only if the coffee
56. Compare Bratman’s comments on the inconsistency of intending x and believing that
one will not x. Id. at 37–41.
57. Ferrero, supra note 10, ¶6.5. Ferrero puts this point in terms of the agglomerativity
constraint, but it holds for consistency as well.
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shop remains open. Adherence to that intention would again render selling
the coffee shop incompatible with Jones’s intent to purchase. The consistency implications of the condition depend not on whether it is enabling
or elective but on whether the agent is practically committed to its being a necessary condition of performing the act in question. That practical commitment might be the result of a belief, an acceptance, or an
intention.
These observations are of a piece with the fact that the consistency constraint requires not only logical consistency but consistency with the agent’s
practical commitments as a whole, including her other intentions, beliefs,
and acceptances. The consistency of A’s intention to x with her other possible intentions depends on A’s commitments as to what xing entails. These
include both the conditions of the possibility of her xing (the enabling conditions Ferrero emphasizes) and the conditions under which she intends to
x (elective conditions), not to mention the natural consequences of xing,
whether intended or not.58
So far I have discussed only background necessary conditions, in which A
believes or intends that she shall x only if C and accepts C. The results carry
over a fortiori to background necessary and sufﬁcient conditions, where A
intends to x if and only if C and accepts that C. Here, too, the condition
ﬁgures into the consistency demands of A’s intention: a commitment to xing
precludes courses of action that entail not-C. The consistency implications of
background sufﬁcient conditions are subtler. If A accepts C, her intention
to x if C would seem to impose the same consistency constraints as an
unconditional intention to x would. The background strictly conditional
intention does, however, constrain A’s reconsideration of xing: she may
consistently decide to not-x only if she no longer accepts C or gives up her
strictly conditional intention to x if C.
With respect to the consistency of an agent’s deliberations, then, background and foreground conditions have something like the opposite effects.
A foreground condition relaxes the consistency constraints the intention
would otherwise impose, allowing the agent to plan for some (but not
58. This last point argues that Jones’s background conditioned intention to expand only if
the coffee shop is still in business imposes consistency constraints of the same sort as her belief
that if she expands she will need to hire more employees. While one refers to a precondition of
expanding and the other a necessary side effect of doing so, both are entailments of performing
the intended act and so ﬁgure into what is consistent with so acting.
This explains how known side effects enter into the content of future-directed intention
without, in an important sense, being intended. A’s intention to x with side effect S screens out
an intention to y, where a condition of the possibility of ying is not-S. While this is beyond the
scope of this article, I believe this point requires reﬁning Bratman’s claim that while choice
is holistic—encompassing the entire scenario intended—future-directed intentions are not.
See BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, supra note 4, at 153–155. Bratman is right to observe that
known side effects do not impose a pressure to intend the means of their realization. But
they do ﬁgure into the consistency constraints that the intention imposes. Future-directed
intentions are also holistic, though not every element in the intentional object plays the same
role.
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all) states of affairs in which she does not perform the act in question.
Background conditions, on the contrary, ﬁgure into the articulation of consistency constraints, further limiting what other intentions the agent may
consider. While foreground conditions permit the agent to entertain a wider
range of possible plans, background conditions restrict the plans she may
contemplate.

B. Means-End Coherence
I turn now to the consequences of background and foreground conditions
for means-end coherence. My thesis is that a foreground necessary or necessary and sufﬁcient condition on an intention reduces the rational pressure
to intend requisite means of performing the act, that a foreground sufﬁcient condition has no immediate implications for means-end coherence,
and that background conditions generally impose no special pressure to
intend requisite means of acting.
Ferrero begins to get at the different means-end consequences of background and foreground conditions when he observes that preparing for
not-C might be more or less reasonable depending in part “on the agent’s
expectation about the obtaining of C”:
In certain contexts, the most reasonable conduct is to accept that C and
behave as if the intention were circumstantially unconditional. At the opposite
extreme, C might be so remote a possibility and ϕ-ing so unimportant that
the most reasonable strategy is to do only what is minimally required to keep
the possibility of her ϕ-ing alive in case C obtains, while devoting all her other
available resources to planning and preparing for C.59

Ferrero’s ﬁrst case, in which the agent accepts that C will be satisﬁed,
describes a background-conditional intention. Here Ferrero’s observation
seems basically correct, though it skips over some details. If A intends C to be
a sufﬁcient or a necessary and sufﬁcient condition of her xing and A accepts
C—in my notation, if A intends (C →B x) or A intends (x ↔B C)—then
means-end coherence requires of A exactly what it would if A intended to x
simpliciter. A should invest no more or less thought and energy in realizing
the means of xing than if she had an unconditional intent to x. If Jones
intends to expand her business if (or if and only if) the movie theater opens
and then learns that it will open, means-end coherence requires her to take
precisely those steps it would require if she unconditionally intended to
expand.
Accepting the satisfaction of a necessary but not sufﬁcient condition has
somewhat different means-end consequences. If A intends or believes that
she shall x only if C—if A intends or believes (x → C)—then her acceptance
59. Ferrero, supra note 10, ¶5.2.
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of C renders that attitude inert with respect to the requirements of meansend coherence. If I have a policy-based intention to swim only on an empty
stomach, my belief or acceptance that I have not eaten in the past two hours
does not yet say whether I intend to swim. If Jones intends to purchase the
building only if, but not necessarily if, her architect reports that the space
is suitable, and the architect’s report is positive, Jones’s subsequent actions
will accord with her conditioned intention whether she purchases or not.60
Ferrero’s second case, in which the agent treats satisfaction of C as an
open question, describes a foreground-conditional intention. Here things
are a bit more complex.
First, notice that Ferrero’s observations have more force when applied
to conditioned or biconditional intentions. If A has a foreground strictly
conditional intention that C shall be a merely sufﬁcient condition of her
xing—A intends (C →F x)—her practical belief that C is unlikely to be
satisﬁed might have few consequences for her assessment of whether she
will x. Should it turn out that not-C, her strictly conditional intention permits
her to choose to x anyway. Thus if Jones intends to expand if but not only
if the movie theater opens and then ﬁnds out that it is unlikely to open,
she might still want to plan in a way that makes it possible to expand, as
she has not yet decided whether to do so in those circumstances. If, on the
contrary, A’s intention is conditioned or biconditional—A intends (x →F
C) or (x ↔F C)—not-C requires that she not x. If Jones intends to expand if
and only if she obtains a construction loan, learning that she is unlikely to
be approved for a loan means that she should plan on not expanding. The
fact that an intention is foreground conditioned or biconditional has more
immediate consequences for means-end coherence than does the fact that
it is foreground strictly conditional.
Second, so long as A treats the satisfaction of C as an open question, her
foreground-conditional intention will put her under some rational pressure
to intend necessary means of xing. A person’s attitude toward a proposition
that exerts no rational pressure on her to realize it in possible future states
of the world might qualify as a wish or a desire but is not an intention.
Third, it does not follow that a foreground-conditional intention to x
exerts the same degree of rational pressure as an unconditional intention to x would. If A intends (x →F C) or if she intends (x ↔F C) and
if she considers it possible that not-C, her investment in preparing to x
might well be tied to her estimation of the probability of C.61 The less
likely she considers C, the less rationality is likely to require or even permit

60. The same holds for Jones’s belief that no condemnation of the property is a necessary
condition of purchasing if she then discovers that it will not be condemned. It makes no
difference whether the necessary condition is elective or enabling.
61. But not in all cases. If, for example, A has a reason to intend or attempt to x other than
the desirability of xing, such as in toxin-puzzle-type cases, a foreground enabling condition
might not affect how much it is rational for A to invest in the means of xing.
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her to invest in requisite means of xing.62 Reduced investment is rational because planning resources are ﬁnite. Planning for possible futures in
which C is satisﬁed requires time and attention that might otherwise be
spent planning for possible futures in which C is not satisﬁed, not to mention planning the rest of the agent’s life or engaging in other worthwhile
pursuits.
This is not to say that the agent’s assessment of the probability of C alone
determines how much it is rational to invest in the means of xing. As Ferrero
observes, other relevant facts include the relative costs of preparing for C
and not-C, the relative beneﬁts A expects from realizing her intentions
conditioned on C and from realizing her intentions conditioned on not-C,
and A’s attitude toward risk.63 That said, a person who has a foregroundconditional intention to x only if C or to x if and only if C should invest
less in achieving the means of xing the less likely she considers C to be.
A foreground condition on her intention is likely to reduce the “rational
pressure for the addition of further intentions.”64
Finally, “planning and preparing for C” will often include adopting
foreground-conditional intentions of the form:
A intends (not-C →F y)

(7)

A intends (z ↔F not-C).

(8)

or:

These intentions, too, will be subject to pressures of means-end coherence,
the force of which will, again, partly depend on the agent’s assumptions
62. Yaffe makes a similar point. Yaffe, Conditional Intent, supra note 8, at 294.
63. Ferrero, supra note 10, ¶ 5.2.
64. BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, supra note 4, at 33. It is an interesting question how we
should describe cases in which satisfaction of a necessary condition on an intention to x is so
unlikely that it reduces the rational pressure to intend necessary means of xing to the point
where, given the costs, it is no longer rational to intend those means. Bratman suggests that in
such cases, the agent no longer intends to x:
Granted, my uncertainty about the efﬁcaciousness of my plan for stopping at the bookstore
might reasonably lead me not to bother with that plan, especially if I ﬁnd the alternative
path home nicer in other respects. But if I am persuaded by this then what I should do
is give up on the intention to stop at the bookstore, not intend to stop there but still not
intend known necessary means.
Bratman, Intention, Belief, supra note 13, at 32. But should we reach the same conclusion if
there is no “alternative path”? Yaffe argues that “in this case, my conditional intention places
me under rational pressure to adopt the means . . . ; it is just that I am under stronger rational
pressure not to decide on any action from which I can expect a loss.” Yaffe, Conditional Intent,
supra note 8, at 294. If the conditional intention still relaxes the consistency and agglomerativity
constraints on the agent’s deliberations, this seems right. If, however, the conditional intention
does not relax those constraints, the agent has accepted the nonsatisfaction of the condition
and the attitude is better characterized at most as a background-conditional intention.
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about the probability of C.65 Foreground necessary conditions on the agent’s
intention to x can in this way take her in new directions, creating a rational
pressure to adopt intentions that are not immediately related to and might
be incompatible with xing.

C. Summary
The main components of the planning theory of conditional intentions
can be summarized as follows. In our everyday talk we mark a difference
between conditions whose nonoccurrence causes the agent to change her
mind and those whose nonoccurrence does not. This intuitive distinction
between background and foreground conditions can be explained by the
effect of accepting satisfaction or nonsatisfaction of the condition, as distinguished from treating it as an open question, where “accepting” means
taking something as given in one’s practical deliberations. The fact that
C is a foreground condition of A’s intention to x has on this theory two
important consequences for A’s ongoing deliberations and other undertakings. First, while consistency with an unconditional intention to x restricts A’s deliberations to plans co-realizable with xing, consistency with
her foreground-conditional intention permits A to consider not-xing in the
case of not-C and, depending on the whether her intention is strictly conditional, conditioned, or biconditional, perhaps other states of affairs as
well. Second, if A’s intention is foreground-conditional—and especially if it
is foreground conditioned or biconditional—the lower A’s evaluation is of
the probability of C, the less pressure means-end coherence creates to intend requisite means of xing. A background condition C on A’s intention to
x, on the contrary, has no such consequences for A’s practical deliberations.
It will, however, ﬁgure into the consistency constraint A’s intention imposes
on those deliberations.
This account explains both the intuitive plausibility of the awareness theory and where that theory goes wrong. When an agent treats the satisfaction
of a condition on her intention as an open question, she is more likely to
attend to it. Foreground conditions pose planning problems—what to do if
the condition is not satisﬁed—that conscious deliberation can solve. But an
agent might attend to a conditional intention even though she accepts that
the condition is satisﬁed or nonsatisﬁed. Suppose Jones intends to expand
the coffee shop and perform under the sales contract. If asked or if she is in
a particularly reﬂective mood, Jones might allow that she will not perform
if the space is condemned or if a Starbucks opens up across the street. She

65. Where the intention is foreground biconditional, the agent should also intend (not-C
→F not-x). If not-xing takes some effort on the agent’s part, means-end coherence will also
require that the agent eventually intend the means of not-xing.
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would then be aware of these background conditions on her intention. But
that theoretical awareness is unlikely to inﬂuence Jones’s practical deliberations or actions. Because she accepts their satisfaction, it would be a waste
of Jones’s limited cognitive resources to plan for either contingency. Such
reﬂective awareness of background conditions belongs to theoretical, not
practical reasoning.66
IV. PROMISSORY REPRESENTATIONS OF INTENT
I now turn to promissory representations of intent and the law’s response
to a promisor’s undisclosed conditional intent to perform. I consider two
related questions: When is a foreground condition on a promisor’s intent to
perform material? And what does a promise implicitly represent about such
conditions and about the promisor’s intent more generally? The analysis
focuses on undisclosed necessary and necessary and sufﬁcient conditions
on a promisor’s intent to perform. A promisor’s strictly conditional intent to
perform—her intent to perform if but not only if the condition is satisﬁed—
is of less legal signiﬁcance.

A. Materiality: Foreground versus Background Conditions
Recall Ayres’s and my suggestion that a “promisor’s intention to perform is
material only because it entails her being likely to perform, only because
66. The above analysis has consequences for the proper analysis of generic ceteris paribus
clauses, such as “provided that it is feasible” or “provided that it is advisable,” which can be
attached to any ascription of intention. Ferrero suggests that such generic qualiﬁcations should
be included in a complete statement of the background conditions on a person’s intention.
Ferrero, supra note 10, ¶¶ 8.1–8.2. Translated into my notation, Ferrero would analyze A’s
foreground unconditional and background-conditional intention to x as:
A intends [(x →B P1 , P2 . . . Pm , & x is feasible) & (C1 , C2 . . . Cq , & x is advisable →B x)],
where “P1 , P2 . . . Pm ” stands for the complete list of “actually articulated” background enabling
conditions on A’s intent and “C1 , C2 . . . Cq ” stands for the complete list of “actually articulated”
background elective conditions on A’s intent. (I take this to be a translation of Ferrero’s (DS-E∗ )
for a foreground unconditional intention; my parsing assumes that Ferrero’s “GIVEN” operator
is meant to describe necessary conditions when applied to enabling conditions and sufﬁcient
ones when applied to elective ones.) Ferrero stipulates that a condition on A’s intent is “actually
articulated” if A explicitly entertains it or might have entertained it at an earlier time or it is
operative in A’s psychology. Id. ¶ 8.1. But once we have included in the analysis of A’s intention
to x all of the background conditions that are operative in A’s psychology, it is difﬁcult to
see what the generic feasibility or advisability conditions add to the analysis, not to mention
conditions that A has or might have entertained but that are not operative, if such conditions
could exist. For any potential condition Ci (or Pi ) on A’s intention to x, either A is rationally
disposed to treat Ci as a condition of her intention to x, or she is not. If A is so disposed,
then Ci is “operative” in A’s psychology. If A is not so disposed, then the condition does not
play a role in her practical reasoning. Ferrero says that the advisability placeholder is meant to
capture the agent’s acknowledgment of “yet unarticulated conditions that, if taken to obtain,
would give her a good enough reason not to ϕ.” Id. ¶ 8.5. But such an acknowledgment belongs
to theoretical, not practical reasoning.
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it provides the promisee crucial information for evaluating [the probability of performance].”67 On this picture, an undisclosed condition on the
promisor’s intent to perform is material when it reduces the likelihood of
performance to a degree that, if it were known to the promisee, would affect
the promisee’s decision to enter into or otherwise invest in the transaction.
Let Pi stand for the mutually understood probability that the promisor will
realize an unconditional intent to do the act promised, and α for the probability that an undisclosed intended necessary and sufﬁcient condition for
her performance will be satisﬁed. While the implicit representation that
attaches to A’s promise of an intent to perform says that the probability of
performance is Pi , in fact the probability is α(Pi ). At some point the difference between Pi and α(Pi ) will be so great that knowledge of the condition
would affect the promisee’s decision-making—he would reduce his investment in the deal, take additional precautions against nonperformance, or
not enter into the transaction at all. This is the point at which the implicit
representation of an unconditional intent to perform materially misrepresents the probability of performance and when an insincere promisor might
be held legally liable for promissory fraud.
While this is correct as far as it goes, it is not the whole picture. As I argue
in Section III, the above analysis cannot account for our intuitions about the
difference between foreground and background conditions. The planning
theory can. On the planning theory, background conditions on an agent’s
intention are those she accepts as satisﬁed, while foreground conditions are
those whose satisfaction she treats as an open question. There are three
reasons on this theory to expect a foreground condition on a promisor’s
intent to perform to be material, though a background condition with the
same content would not be: the foreground condition is likely to affect
the promisor’s preperformance deliberations and behavior in a way that
further reduces the likelihood of performance; the fact that the promisor
has not accepted satisfaction of the condition for the purposes of her own
practical deliberations is evidence that the promisee should also to take
the possibility into account; and a foreground condition is more likely to
prevent the parties from ﬁlling contract gaps in a mutually satisfactory way.
At this point, let me drop Jones’s hypothetical coffee shop and use as
an example the facts described by the Hawaii Supreme Court in Chung v.
Kaonohi Center Co.68 In January 1972, the Chung plaintiffs signed with the
defendants a ten-year lease for a food concession space in a mall that the
67. AYRES & KLASS, supra note 3, at 35.
68. Chung v. Kaonohi Center Co., 618 P.2d 283 (Haw. 1980). Chung afﬁrmed an emotional
distress award based on a tort theory of wanton or reckless conduct in the breach. The Hawaiian
court has since rejected that rule, abrogating the holding in Chung, and ruled that emotional
damages are available only when the defendant’s behavior violates an independent tort-based
duty. Francis v. Lee Enters., Inc., 971 P.2d 707, 717 (Haw. 1999). But as Ayres and I argue, the
Chung defendants’ behavior looks like it also satisﬁes the elements of promissory fraud, which
would support the award of punitive damages in the case even under the new rule. AYRES &
KLASS, supra note 3, at 28.
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defendants were building. After the parties signed the lease, the “plaintiffs
arranged for ﬁnancing, ordered equipment and furnishings, hired chefs
and workers, advertised in the yellow pages of the telephone book for the
to-be-built kitchen, and incurred other expenses.”69 Though the defendants
were aware of the plaintiffs’ investments, they continued to offer the space
to other potential tenants. Eventually the defendants signed another, presumably more proﬁtable, lease for the space and in June 1973 informed the
plaintiffs that it was no longer available.
The Chung defendants’ postformation behavior is strong evidence that
their intent to perform was foreground conditioned or biconditional—
that the defendants intended to perform their promise to lease only if,
or if and only if, they did not ﬁnd another, more proﬁtable tenant. But
the defendants’ continued negotiations with other tenants were not only
evidence of an undisclosed condition on their intent to perform; from the
plaintiffs’ perspective, those negotiations were also part of the problem with
the undisclosed condition. The foreground condition did not decrease the
probability of performance by some ﬁxed probability, as “α(Pi )” might suggest. It also affected the defendants’ attitudes and actions prior to the time
of performance in a way that further reduced the chance they would perform.70 Most obviously on the facts of the case, the foreground condition
relaxed the consistency constraint that an unconditional intent to perform
or a background conditioned intent would otherwise impose, permitting
the defendants rationally to pursue plans, like leasing the space to someone
else, incompatible with performance. Such alternative planning worked
to decrease the chances that the condition would be satisﬁed—that is, it
reduced α. Here we see an advantage of the truth-functional reading of
conditional intentions. The Chung defendants worked to realize their foreground biconditional intention by preventing satisfaction of the condition.
Chung is perhaps unusual, as the satisfaction of the condition was partly
in the defendant’s control. But even where this is not the case, or where the
defendant has independent reasons to prefer the condition’s satisfaction, a
foreground necessary condition is still likely to affect her planning and the
resources she invests in performing. As I argue in Section III, the fact that
a person’s intent to x is foreground conditioned or biconditional reduces
the rational pressure to adopt necessary means of xing. Recall the Hillcrest
case, in which the defendant did not disclose that she intended to purchase
a neighboring property for parking only if she found a tenant for it.71 Even
if we assume that the defendant made every effort to ﬁnd a tenant for the
property, the undisclosed condition reduced the rational pressure on her to
69. Chung, supra note 68, at 286.
70. Bratman makes a related point: “the dispositions to ﬁgure out how to do what one
intends, and to settle on needed preliminary steps, provide support for the expectation that
an agent will both be in a position to do what she intends and succeed in doing it.” BRATMAN,
INTENTION, PLANS, supra note 4, at 18.
71. Hillcrest, supra note 1.
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take other steps necessary to purchasing it—to contact the owners, to secure
funds for the purchase, to put down a nonrefundable deposit, and so forth.
Such decreased investment in performance further reduces the probability
of performance—now not by reducing α but by reducing the chances that
the promisor will be able to perform if the condition is satisﬁed, or reducing
Pi .
These consequences would not have attached if the Chung or Hillcrest
defendants’ intent to perform had been background biconditional. If the
Chung defendants had accepted that they would not ﬁnd a more proﬁtable
tenant—if they had taken it as given in their practical deliberations that
the condition on their intention to perform would be satisﬁed—consistency
would have prevented them from seeking out other tenants, and means-end
coherence would have required them to invest in planning for performance
as if their intent to perform were unconditional. If the Hillcrest defendant
had taken it as given that she would ﬁnd a tenant for the neighboring
property, means-end coherence would have required the same investments
in preparing to purchase as an unconditional intent to purchase would
have.
A second reason foreground conditions on a promisor’s intent to perform
are much more likely to be material follows from the fact that the promisor
has not accepted the condition in her own deliberations. A promisor’s acceptance of a condition C on her intent to perform means that she takes C
as given in her practical deliberations, though on reﬂection or when considering other practical problems, she might recognize the possibility of not-C.
An agent’s acceptance of a condition is often based on an informal and
unreﬂective cost-beneﬁt analysis. It is rational to accept C for the purposes
of one’s practical deliberations when, given what one knows, C is so likely
true that the risk-adjusted beneﬁts of planning for not-C are not worth its
cognitive-resource costs.72 When considering whether to ride my bike to
campus, it is rational for me to assume it will get me there. The chance that
it will not is so low that it is not worth the time or effort to consider. But if I
know that my chain has been slipping and the derailleur sticking, it might
be worth taking that possibility into account. That an agent treats C as an
open question suggests a (perhaps reﬂexive) judgment on her part that the
chances of not-C are so high that it is worth the time and effort to plan for
that contingency.

72. I take this to be implicit in Bratman’s description of simpliﬁcation. BRATMAN, Practical
Reasoning, supra note 35, at 21–22. Compare Bratman’s description of the cost-beneﬁt analysis
involved in when it is rational to reconsider one’s intentions. BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, supra
note 4, at 64–70.
Bratman suggests a number of other possible reasons for acceptance, including special
relations with others. BRATMAN, Practical Reasoning, supra note 35, at 25. Some contractual
promises—those that establish a moral relationship between the parties—might create the sort
of special relation that makes it rational for the promisor to deliberate as if her conditional
intent to perform were unconditional.
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Such a judgment by a promisor with respect to a condition on her intent
to perform would be of obvious interest to the promisee.73 This is again
illustrated by the facts in Chung. If the Chung defendants’ intention to lease
the space to the plaintiffs was foreground-conditional on not ﬁnding a
better tenant, that was because they considered the probability of ﬁnding
another tenant high enough that it was worth taking that possibility into
account in their practical deliberations. That fact alone—apart from the
condition’s effect on the defendants’ preperformance deliberations and
actions—suggests that the plaintiffs would also have wanted to take it into
account. Knowledge of the condition would also have affected the plaintiffs’
deliberations about how much to invest in the transaction. This logic would
not apply if the defendants’ intent to lease had been merely background
conditioned on there being no better offer for the space. In that case, the
defendants themselves would have made a judgment that the probability of
a better deal was so low that it was not worth planning for that contingency,
suggesting that the plaintiffs need not worry about it either.
A ﬁnal reason we should expect foreground conditions to be material involves Bratman’s concept of shared intentions. My discussion of Bratman’s
planning theory has so far emphasized the intrapersonal function of futureoriented intentions: intentions organize an individual’s deliberations and
actions over time, allowing her to settle on and effectively pursue objectives that require temporally extended planning and execution. Intentions
also enable complex interpersonal coordination. One way is obvious: B’s
knowledge that A intends to x often supports a prediction that A will x,
which permits B to coordinate his behavior with A’s.74 But that is not all.
Bratman’s theory of shared intentions extends his planning theory to describe the distinctive attitudes of persons engaged in shared projects, such
as painting a house together or singing a duet.75 The technical details of the
theory are relatively complex, and its application to contractual agreements
raises issues beyond the central themes of this article. But I hope at least to
indicate how the role of shared intentions in many contractual agreements
provides a third reason to care especially about foreground conditions on
a promisor’s intent to perform.
It is common wisdom among contract theorists today that parties’ contractual obligations—their legal duties—often do not map onto their reasonable expectations of one another.76 In Karl Llewellyn’s words, there is a
73. This is especially the case where the promisor knows more than the promisee about the
likely satisfaction of the condition. It is therefore relevant that the Chung defendants were in
the business of leasing such properties and therefore probably knew more than the plaintiffs
about the chances that a more proﬁtable tenant would come along.
74. See BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, supra note 4, at 37.
75. Michael E. Bratman, Shared Cooperative Activity, 101 PHIL. REV. 327 (1992), reprinted in
FACES OF INTENTION: SELECTED ESSAYS ON INTENTION AND AGENCY 93 (1999); MICHAEL E. BRATMAN,
Shared Intention, 104 ETHICS 97 (1993), reprinted in FACES OF INTENTION: SELECTED ESSAYS ON
INTENTION AND AGENCY 109 (1999).
76. As Robert Scott says, “[w]e are all relationalists now.” Scott, supra note 11, at 852.
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“difference in content between the running, ﬂexible obligation understood
in fact by the parties and the rigid, stereotyped obligation which is all the law
will recognize.”77 For example, while a commercial lease might impose a variety of detailed obligations on the parties—permitted use of the space, how
it will be ﬁtted out, maintenance, security, insurance, and so forth—other
aspects of their relationship will be left to future agreement, negotiation,
or bargaining. One reason parties can rationally leave such matters undecided is that each typically has evidence that the other is committed to the
transaction. To take a trivial example, suppose the Chung lease required the
defendant-owners to paint the space but did not specify a color.78 Suppose
further (perhaps contrary to fact) that a court would read the lease as permitting the owners to use any color they chose. The tenants might sign such
a lease with a reasonable expectation that the owners would consult with
them on the color despite not having a legal obligation to do so. Assuming
that the owners intended to go through with the transaction, the owners
would also be interested in the success of the tenants’ venture, which would
have positive spillover effects for the mall as a whole. And because the owners are committed to the transaction, they have a general interest in the
tenants’ continued participation in it and so in the tenants’ satisfaction.
We can generalize from this example and translate it into Bratman’s
theory of shared intentions as follows. Relational contracts are not simply
exchanges of unilateral promises but involve agreements to engage in joint
intentional or shared cooperative activities—“shared projects” for short.79
These can be as simple as having someone ﬁx a bicycle or as complex as a
long-term management agreement. As with other intentions, each party’s
intent to take part in the shared project creates a rational pressure further
to intend and undertake the necessary means of realizing that project. But
unlike nonshared intentions, because each intends the activity as a shared
project, each is further committed to intending means that are consistent
with the means intended by the other. As Bratman puts it, they are committed to meshing subplans. When the means of realizing the joint project
are not speciﬁed in advance (as in a contract), the commitment to engage
in the shared project imposes a rational pressure to reach agreement on
them. Each party’s commitment to the shared project therefore underwrites
a prediction that they will be able to ﬁll gaps in their original plan in a way
generally satisfactory to both.

77. Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?—An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 712–713
(1931). The two classic modern works in the ﬁeld are Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963); and Ian Macneil, Contracts:
Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract
Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854 (1978).
78. The example is adapted from Bratman. See BRATMAN, Cooperative Activity, supra note 75,
at 98–99.
79. For the difference between joint intentional and shared cooperative activities, see Scott
J. Shapiro, Law, Plans, and Practical Reason, 8 LEGAL THEORY 387, 394–401 (2002).
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While there is more to be said about the details of this picture,80 this is
enough to identify the negative relational consequences of an undisclosed
foreground condition on one party’s intent to complete the transaction. Just
as a conditional intent to perform reduces the rational pressure to intend
means of performing and permits the promisor to plan rationally for her
breach, so in a relational contract a foreground condition will reduce the
pressure to arrive at mutually acceptable approaches to as-yet-unspeciﬁed
details of the transaction. The Chung defendants’ foreground-conditional
intent to perform made it all the more likely that they would conform to the
letter of the lease (in the imagined case, painting the space) without attending to its spirit (choosing a color that worked with the plaintiffs’ planned
use). In extreme cases of unilateral, self-interested exercises of contractual
discretion, a promisor risks liability for breach of the duty of good faith.
Between those extreme cases and collaborative gap-ﬁlling lies a range of
uncooperative behavior that denies the other party some reasonably expected beneﬁt without breaching the contract. An undisclosed foreground
condition (but not a background condition) to perform makes it all the
more likely that the promisor’s behavior will tend toward the unilateral and
uncooperative end of that range, depriving the promisee of beneﬁts she
reasonably expects even if the promisor ultimately performs.
In sum, the planning theory of conditional intentions explains as follows
the legal relevance of foreground and background necessary conditions on a
promisor’s intent to perform. Both foreground and background conditions
on that intention impact the probability of performance. An intent to x only
if, or if and only if, C means that the probability that the agent will x depends
in part on the likelihood of C, whether or not the promisor accepts C in her
practical deliberations. The promisor’s nonacceptance of C, however, has
several important consequences. For one thing, it means that she perceives
the chances of not-C as high enough to warrant taking that possibility into
account in her own practical deliberations. This suggests that the promisee
might also want to take into account the possibility of not-C and its impact on the promisor’s performance. In addition, the promisor’s nonacceptance of a condition on her performance can affect her deliberations and
preperformance behavior in ways that harm the promisee. She is more likely
to continue planning for possible futures in which she does not perform

80. More, for example, about the degree of cooperation, about the extent to which the
parties’ plans must mesh, and about the nature of the shared project. Any thinking about
the degree of cooperation in contractual relationships should take account of Shapiro’s work
on shared intentions in institutional, authority-based structures. Id. passim. With respect to
the nature of the shared project, the above description purposively leaves room for a thicker
account of shared projects than Daniel Markovits’s description of contractual exchanges as joint
intentional activities arising out of relatively thin promissory commitments. Daniel Markovits,
Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1456–1463 (2003); see Gregory Klass, Three Pictures
of Contract: Power, Duty and Compound Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1726, 1747–1750 (2008) (suggesting
an alternative description).
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and less likely to invest in securing the means of performance. And a foreground condition on a promisor’s intent to perform reduces the rational
pressure on her to ﬁll contract gaps in ways that mesh with the promisee’s
plans and preferences. None of these consequence attaches to background
conditions on a promisor’s intent to perform.

B. What a Promise Says
Both Richard Craswell and Aditi Bagchi suggest that on Ayres’s and my theory, the law might dispense with promissory representations of intent and
focus solely on what a promise says about the probability of performance.
Craswell advocates such a rule. He worries that a focus on the promisor’s intent “too easily slide[s] into a binary inquiry: Either the defendant intended
to perform, or she didn’t.”81 Starting from our suggestion that a promisor’s
intentions are material only because of what they tell the promisee about
the probability of performance, Craswell argues:
as long as the probability of performance is what is material to customers, that
is the variable that will normally carry most of the weight, both in assessing
potential costs and in assessing potential beneﬁts. Parties’ intentions, by contrast, will be relevant (in a cost-beneﬁt analysis) only for what they tell us about
the costs and beneﬁts of the more material variables.82

Bagchi reaches the same conclusion about the implications of our analysis,
though she is more critical of them.83 On her view, our approach neglects
the special moral problems with lying promises and therefore is incomplete
as an account of the law of promissory fraud. A concept of promisor intent
that is no more than a placeholder for the probability of performance “is a
hollow one, and it would empty the doctrine of promissory fraud of much
of its moral import—or, it would empty it of all the moral force associated
with voluntary commitment and its breach.”84
I think neither of these criticisms hits the mark, even assuming the relatively impoverished concept of intent that Ayres and I employ. From a
strictly consequentialist perspective, there would be reasons for the law to
focus on promisor intent even if all that mattered were the probability of
performance. The representation of an intent to perform is an integral

81. Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565, 628 (2006).
82. Id. at 629.
83. “[I]n Ayres and Klass’s strictly economic account, this subjective intent is drained of any
agent particularity. As such, Ayres and Klass could do well enough without the complicating
notion of intent. . . . It would be cleaner to speak of the probability of performance in purely
objective terms without alluding to choice.” Aditi Bagchi, The Accidental Promise: Remaking the
Law of Misrepresented Intent, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 985, 992; see also id. at 1002, 1006–1007.
84. Id. at 1007.

http://journals.cambridge.org

A Conditional Intent to Perform

145

part of the extralegal practice of entering into an agreement—not because
it provides information about the probability of performance, but because
an intent to perform is, to use John Searle’s phrase, among the normal
“felicity conditions” of undertaking a voluntary obligation.85 That representation of intent, while not as informative or ﬁne-grained as a representation
of the probability of performance, is cheap to include, easy to understand,
and usually gives the promisee all the information he needs as to the probability of performance. By the same token, framing the question in terms
of the promisor’s intent serves a valuable heuristic function in an ex post
evaluation of whether there was a material misrepresentation. While courts
should be sensitive to the fact that intent is not all that is material, it would
be wrong to jettison it from the legal inquiry. I would also take issue with
Bagchi’s characterization of our attitude as purely consequentialist and her
assumption that we have an “objection” to moral theories of the law of
promissory misrepresentation.86 Our argument focuses on consequentialist
legal arguments because in our view the results of that analysis are the more
surprising ones, not because we believe deontological arguments had no
place in legal reasoning.87
That said, Craswell’s and Bagchi’s readings make a certain amount of
sense given the anemic concept of intention we employ in the book. The
above, more robust concept suggests deeper, though still consequentialist,
reasons why the law should attend to the promisor’s intent to perform. Contrary to our assumption in Insincere Promises, promissory representations of
intent are material not only because they say something about the probability of performance but because they provide important information about
the promisor’s likely attitudes and actions in the time leading up to performance. Especially in relational contracts in which the parties rely on
nonlegal norms and other incentives, a promissory representation of intent
says as much about the value of the transaction as a whole as about the
probability of performance. In such transactions, the promisor’s lack of an
intent to perform can prevent her from acting in ways that are not required
by the contract but would beneﬁt the promisee. The richer conception of
intent also ﬁgures into the moral reasons for holding insincere promisors
legally liable that concern Bagchi.
The planning theory also suggests reﬁnements to Ayres’s and my analysis
of the representational content of contractual promises. As noted above,
promissory representations of intent often occur against a shared understanding of conditions under which the promisor might choose not to
85. JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 54–63 (1969); see
also AYRES & KLASS, supra note 3, at 29 (describing moral basis for promissory representations).
If this is right, the bare representation of an intent to perform is neither a conversational
implicature nor a conventional one. See STEPHEN C. LEVINSON, PRAGMATICS 126–132 (1983)
(describing the distinction between conversational and conventional implicature).
86. Bagchi, supra note 83, at 1005 n. 83.
87. See AYRES & KLASS, supra note 3, at 61.

http://journals.cambridge.org

146

GREGORY KLASS

perform or be prevented from doing so. That “background” understanding
should not be confused with the background conditions on the promisor’s
intent to perform. Background conditions qualify as such by virtue of their
role in the promisor’s practical reasoning, not the promisee’s knowledge
of them. And while the parties might have a shared understanding of what
those background conditions are likely to be, we should not be too quick to
assume that the act of promising says anything about them.
This is so because the implicit content of a speech act depends in part
on the objective importance of the information in question.88 For all the
reasons discussed above, the background conditions on a promisor’s intent to perform are normally not material. They are relatively unimportant.
While the details are complex, this suggests that an unconditional promise
represents an unconditional intent to perform, not an intent to perform in
certain mutually understood and accepted circumstances.89 This is so despite the fact that both parties should understand that an intent to perform
is not an intent to perform come what may; that is, that the promisor’s intent
to perform will naturally be background-conditional. Because a foreground
condition on the promisor’s intent to perform is much more likely to be of
importance to the promisee, conversational norms require that a promisor
with a foreground-conditional intent qualify the otherwise implicit promissory representation.90
Another way of putting the above point is to say that a contractual promise
does not, as such, represent anything about the promisor’s character—about
her dispositions to perform or breach in circumstances that while they may
be theoretically possible, she does not consider practically relevant. What a
promise normally does represent is the promisor’s present practical attitude
toward performance: that she intends to perform and, by implication, that
she presently accepts the satisfaction of any conditions on that intent. The
promise represents that the promisor’s intent to perform is not foregroundconditional, although, like all intentions, it will be subject to an indeﬁnite
number of background conditions.
V. CONCLUSION
An intent to perform is not like a billiard ball that the promisor puts in
motion and which then continues in a straight line until it is withdrawn,
88. For a brief account of this Gricean point, see Craswell, supra note 81, at 601–05. See
generally PAUL GRICE, Logic and Conversation, in STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 22 (1989); GRICE,
Further Notes on Logic and Conversation, in STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 50 (1989).
89. The above argument is very abbreviated. One would want to say more, for example,
about just how Grice’s cooperation principle and the rules of conversational implicature
interact with the implicit representation of an intent to perform, which, as I observe above,
supra note 85, is not a product of conversational implicature.
90. Such a qualiﬁcation would be required, for example, by Grice’s ﬁrst maxim of quantity: “Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the
exchange).” GRICE, Logic and Conversation, supra note 88, at 26.
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blocked, or realized. A promisor’s intent with respect to performance structures her deliberations and behavior along the way, and the promisee might
reasonably care as much about those intervening effects as about the bare
likelihood of performance. A promisor’s intent with respect to performance
is material not only because it says something about the probability of her
performance but also because it is crucial information about her attitude
toward the transaction as a whole.
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